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I. INTRODUCTIONIF asbestos litigation is the "mother" of all mass tort litigation,' as
more than one commentator has suggested, then the state of Texas
could fairly be described as the mother's birthplace. It is widely ac-
knowledged that asbestos litigation effectively began with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's "seminal and wide-ranging opinion in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp.,"2 which affirmed a jury verdict in an asbestos case tried
in a Beaumont, Texas federal court.3 In the decades following Borel,
Texas trial and appellate courts arguably played the preeminent role, not
only in shaping the substantive law applicable to cases involving injuries
caused by asbestos and other industrial toxic substances, but also in de-
veloping and honing procedural tools for managing asbestos litigation
and other types of mass torts. Initially, the Texas federal courts, led by the
* B.A., Columbia University; J.D., University of Texas School of Law. Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas, and Lecturer at Law in Mass Tort Litigation, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity Dedman School of Law.
1. See, e.g., S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlements, 42 U. MEM. L.
REV. 559, 564 (2012); Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88
VA. L. REv. 1721, 1756 (2002).
2. See, e.g., Michael Green, A Future for Asbestos Apportionment?, 12 CONN. INS.
L.J. 315, 318 (2006) (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973)); David G. Owen, Inherent Product Hazards, 93 Ky. L.J. 377, 411-12 (2005) (same).
3. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1081.
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Fifth Circuit and Judge Robert Parker of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas, took the lead in creating this law. These
courts issued comprehensive and often controversial opinions on such is-
sues as the availability of damages for risk and fear of future injury,4 re-
covery of punitive damages by successive litigants for the same course of
wrongful conduct,5 the use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel6 and ex-
trapolation techniques7 to decide purportedly common issues and stream-
line the litigation, and the availability of the class action device to
produce a global resolution of mass tort claims.8
As asbestos litigation migrated to state court in the early 1990s, the
Texas Supreme Court began to issue landmark opinions on both procedu-
ral and substantive issues. The issues decided by the supreme court in-
cluded the criteria to be considered in consolidating cases for pretrial
proceedings and trial,9 the availability of punitive damages to mass tort
claimants,' 0 and the viability of successive suits for separate injuries
caused by the same toxic exposure."
By the turn of the millennium, however, the climate for mass tort litiga-
tion in Texas was noticeably cooling. In 2003, the Texas Legislature en-
acted what is known to practitioners as "House Bill 4," a comprehensive
series of amendments to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code that
greatly curtailed recoveries available in tort cases.12 In 2005, the Texas
Legislature added Chapter 90 to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code to govern claims for asbestos and silica-related injuries. Among
other reforms, Chapter 90 requires that claimants alleging non-malignant
asbestos-related and silica-related injuries to produce documentation that
they satisfy specific impairment criteria before their claims can proceed,' 3
and precludes the trial of more than one asbestos claim at a time.14 Be-
cause the overwhelming majority of asbestos claimants alleged non-ma-
lignant injuries and because most of these litigants could not satisfy
4. Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1985); Gideon v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136-38 (5th Cir. 1985).
5. King v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1022, 1032 (5th Cir. 1990).
6. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1360-61 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
rev'd in part, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
7. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 663-64 (E.D. Tex. 1990), affd in
part, vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
8. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Ahearn v. Fiber-
board Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (N.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd sub nom. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d
963 (5th Cir. 1996), and vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997), and affd, 134 F.3d
668 (5th Cir. 1998), and vacated and rev'd sub nom. Ortiz v. Fiberboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815
(1999).
9. In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 620 (Tex. 1998).
10. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 52-54 (Tex. 1998).
11. Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 653-54 (Tex. 2000).
12. See generally H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN., TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN., TEX. FIN. CODE ANN., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN., TEX. Hum. RES. CODE ANN., TEX. INS. CODE ANN., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN., TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN., TEX. TRANsP. CODE ANN.).
13. Id. §§ 90.003-.007.
14. Id. § 90.009.
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Chapter 90's strict criteria for maintaining compensable claims, it is not
an overstatement to suggest that Chapter 90 literally decimated the asbes-
tos docket in Texas.15
At the same time the Texas Legislature was enacting these statutory
tort reforms, the Texas Supreme Court and Texas appellate courts began
to exhibit new and vigorous skepticism of the legal viability of many mass
tort cases. In Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, the Texas Supreme
Court reversed a jury verdict in favor of a worker who had contracted
silicosis from using the defendant's flint products because the trial court
failed to consider whether knowledge of the product's hazards by em-
ployers in general excused the defendant from the duty to warn. 16 In Al-
coa, Inc. v. Behringer, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict
in favor of a woman who contracted mesothelioma as a result of her ex-
posure to asbestos on her ex-husband's work clothes, ruling that the de-
fendant-employer owed no duty to a worker's spouse who encounters the
work hazard away from the employer's premises.17 Most significantly, in
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a toxic
tort plaintiff must present "[diefendant-specific evidence relating to the
approximate dose to which the plaintiff was exposed" to make a submis-
sible case.18 The supreme court rejected the then-prevalent view that
proof of "any exposure" to a toxic substance could be legally sufficient
proof of causation.19 Recently criticized by the Nevada Supreme Court as
"too stringent," 20 the Flores test has been repeatedly invoked by Texas
appellate courts in finding the plaintiffs' proof of causation to be legally
insufficient. 21
Finally, in recent years the Texas courts have shown increasing intoler-
ance for conduct that plaintiffs' lawyers might characterize as legitimate
strategic approaches to maximize the value of their clients's claims, but
that defendants condemn as the assertion of meritless or even fraudulent
claims. The most highly publicized example of this intolerance is Judge
Janis Jack's opinion in In re Silica Products Liability Litigation, in which
Judge Jack cited evidence that the plaintiffs' lawyers employed unseemly
15. See Mark A. Behrens, What's New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REv. LmG. 501, 523
(2009) (describing the "dramatic reduction in the number of filings by unimpaired
claimants").
16. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.3d 170, 172-73,195 (Tex. 2004).
17. Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 460-62 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet.
denied).
18. Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765, 773 (Tex. 2007).
19. See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 15, at 528-29 (describing the then-prevailing view).
20. Holcomb v. G. Pac., LLC, 289 P.3d 188, 195 (Nev. 2012) (noting that the Flores
test "overburdens the claimant, who might not be able to sufficiently demonstrate not only
the dosage quantity of exposure to a particular defendant's product but also the total as-
bestos dosage to which he was exposed").
21. See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Bostic, 320 S.W.3d 588, 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010,
pet. granted) (reversing jury verdict in plaintiffs favor in a mesothelioma case); Smith v.
Kelly-Moore Paint Co., Inc., 307 S.W.3d 829, 830-31, 839 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no
pet.) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant in a mesothelioma case); Geor-
gia-Pac. Corp. v. Stephens, 239 S.W.3d 304, 321 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
denied) (reversing jury verdict in mesothelioma case).
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screening practices and filed suit based on improbable exposure scenarios
and highly suspect medical reports.22 In addition, in a series of decisions
beginning almost two decades ago, the Texas Supreme Court condemned
what it perceived as efforts by plaintiffs' lawyers to inflate the value of
marginal mass tort claims through evasive, obstructive, and unfair discov-
ery practices. 23
Taken together, these developments-legislative curtailment of mass
tort remedies, reevaluation by the courts of the common law standards
and procedural ground rules governing mass tort cases, and judicial dis-
pleasure with alleged ethical breaches in the assertion of mass tort
claims-have rendered Texas a chilly, and thus unlikely, forum for mass
tort cases. The evidence for this proposition comes in various forms. A
review of the activity of the Texas Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion reveals that in the time since the last Survey on this topic (November
2010) the Panel has considered no requests for multidistrict consolidation
of any claims that can be described as mass tort litigation.24 The public
press has noted that tort reform legislation, recent appellate court deci-
sions, and the cost of litigation have caused the number of jury trials to
decline dramatically. 25 It also reports that plaintiffs' lawyers in Texas, in-
cluding lawyers that handle mass tort claims, have transitioned from han-
dling personal injury cases to taking on contract disputes, intellectual
property matters, and other types of business litigation. 26 Perhaps most
relevant for the purposes of this article, the state and federal courts have
issued fewer significant opinions in the areas of toxic torts and mass tort
litigation than they did in the days before these litigation phenomena
were recognized. 27 The mass tort cases anticipated in the prior Survey28 -
the Toyota "unintended acceleration" cases and the litigation resulting
from the Transocean oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico-were pri-
marily pursued in other jurisdictions.29
Despite this mass tort and toxic tort "Ice Age" in Texas, the Texas
courts have issued a few opinions of interest to mass tort and toxic tort
practitioners since the last Survey on these topics. Additionally, the
22. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 625 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
23. See In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 655 (Tex. 2007); In re Van Waters &
Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 208-12 (Tex. 2004); In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d
938, 941-42 (Tex. 1998); Able Supply Co. v. Moye, 898 S.W.2d 766, 768-71 (Tex. 1995).
24. See United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Multi Circuit Petition
Report, (2012), available at www.jpml.uscourts.gov.
25. Mark Curriden, Civil Jury Trials Plummet in Texas, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS
(Apr. 2, 2012, 9:41 PM), www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20120402-civil-jury-trials-
plummet-in-texas.ece.
26. Janet Elliott, Personal Injury Lawyers Turn to Representing Businesses, THE DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS (Nov. 28, 2012, 9:00 PM), www.dallasnews.com/business/. . ./
20121128-personal-injury-lawyers-turn-to-representing-businesses.ece.
27. See Behrens, supra note 15, at 504-05.
28. Brent Rosenthal, Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 64 SMU L. REV. 583, 583 (2011).
29. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, &
Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mex. on April 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352
(J.P.M.L. 2010).
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United States Supreme Court issued several opinions that are worthy of
review on topics such as preemption, class certification, and the prerequi-
sites for pursuing a securities fraud claim based on a misstatement of po-
tential mass tort liabilities.
II. TEXAS STATE COURT OPINIONS
A. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
During the Survey Period, the Texas Supreme Court's most significant
decision in the toxic and mass tort litigation area solidified liability pro-
tection afforded by the learned intermediary doctrine for manufacturers
of prescription drugs.30 Under the learned intermediary doctrine, a pre-
scription drug manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn of the risks of its
product by providing adequate warnings to the prescribing physician; the
manufacturer ordinarily has no duty to warn the consumer directly. As
the 2010 Survey reported,31 in Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals declined to apply the learned intermediary doc-
trine to protect a prescription drug manufacturer from liability for failure
to warn because the jury found that the manufacturer engaged in decep-
tive advertising.32 Relying on an opinion of the New Jersey Supreme
Court,3 3 the court of appeals observed that the learned intermediary doc-
trine is largely based on "images of health care that no longer exist" 34 and
held that the doctrine will not bar a failure-to-warn claim "when a drug
manufacturer engages in direct-to-consumer advertising that fraudulently
touts the drug's efficacy while failing to warn of the risks."35 The Survey
noted, however, that whether the Texas Supreme Court would "condone
the abolition of the learned intermediary defense in this context remains
to be seen."36
In a decision that delighted the business community and disappointed,
but did not surprise, pro-consumer critics of the Texas Supreme Court,37
the supreme court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and ren-
dered judgment in favor of Centocor based on the learned intermediary
defense.38 The supreme court did not reject the direct-to-consumer ad-
vertising exception outright, acknowledging that "some situations may re-
quire exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine," but it held that
30. See Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 173 (Tex. 2012).
31. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 590-91.
32. Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 310 S.W.3d 476, 502-06 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2010), rev'd in part, 372 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. 2012).
33. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
34. Centocor, 310 S.W.3d at 480.
35. Id. at 499.
36. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 591.
37. Compare case detail for Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton on the Washington Legal
Foundation website with case detail in the article Immunity for Big Pharma on the Texas
Watch website. Case Detail Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDA-
TION, www.wlf.org/litigating/case-detail.asp?id=682; Immunity For Big Pharma, TEXAS
WATCH (June 18, 2012), www.texaswatch.org/2012/06/immunity-for-big-pharma/.
38. Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 173 (Tex. 2012).
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"based on the facts of this case, no exception applies." 39 Patricia Hamil-
ton, the plaintiff in Centocor, was prescribed Centocor's product, Remi-
cade, to treat her Crohn's disease. She received the drug intravenously at
an infusion clinic. Neither the doctor at the clinic nor the nurse that ad-
ministered the drug discussed with the plaintiff the risks of Remicade, but
during the infusion process, they played a video (provided by Centocor)
for her about Remicade. The video stated that "there are very little [sic]
side effects that people need to watch for" and "did not mention [a] lu-
pus-like syndrome"-the condition that the plaintiff developed-as a po-
tential side effect of Remicade. 40
The supreme court reversed the jury's finding of liability, reasoning
that "the alleged harm was not caused by Centocor's direct advertising to
Patricia" because she "was already receiving her first infusion when the
video started" 41-even though Patricia received at least fourteen addi-
tional Remicade infusions after her first treatment. 42 The supreme court
added that the video was "not the type of misleading DTC [direct-to-
consumer] advertising" that warranted consideration of an exception to
the learned intermediary doctrine because the videos were merely availa-
ble "to help patients feel more relaxed about the infusion process, by
explaining some of the benefits and side effects of the treatment pro-
cess." 43 Acknowledging that "pharmaceutical companies have increased
DTC advertising since courts first adopted the learned intermediary doc-
trine," the supreme court concluded that "the fundamental rationale for
the doctrine remains the same: prescription drugs require a doctor's pre-
scription and, therefore, doctors are best suited to communicate the risks
and benefits of prescription medications for particular patients through
their face-to-face interactions with patients." 44
Despite this reasoning, the supreme court also relieved the doctor who
administered the Remicade from a duty to warn. 45 The supreme court
determined that since he did not prescribe the drug, the administering
doctor "owed no additional duty to warn Patricia merely because he pro-
vided informational materials to her that he received from Centocor."46
According to the supreme court, to impose such a duty "could thwart the
efforts of prescription drug manufacturers to provide valuable educa-
tional information about available treatments." 47 The supreme court
reached this conclusion despite the jury's findings that Centocor was lia-
ble for fraud, misrepresentation, and negligent marketing in its sales of
Remicade. 48
39. Id. at 162.
40. Id. at 147-48.
41. Id. at 162-63.
42. Id. at 148.
43. Id. at 163.
44. Id. at 164.
45. Id. at 167.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 151.
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Finally, the supreme court rejected as a matter of law the jury's finding
that Centocor was liable for misrepresenting the risks of Remicade to the
prescribing physicians in the package inserts. To show the inadequacy of
the warning, the plaintiff presented proof that although the package in-
sert stated that three patients developed lupus-like symptoms after re-
ceiving Remicade in clinical studies, an internal Centocor e-mail
referenced at least 174 patients in such studies that developed lupus-like
symptoms. The supreme court dismissed the discrepancy as showing only
"de minimus differences in risk" that were "legally insufficient to create a
fact question for the jury." 4 9 The supreme court added that even if the
package label was inadequate, the plaintiff did not prove that the inade-
quate label was a cause of her injury because she failed to show that an
accurate label "would have changed Patricia's prescribing physician's de-
cision to prescribe Remicade in light of her complicated medical history
and serious ailments."50 The supreme court's opinion in Centocor estab-
lishes huge hurdles for plaintiffs to overcome in order to recover damages
caused by a prescription drug.
B. SCIENTIFIC CAUSATION
In its landmark opinion in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hay-
ner,51 the Texas Supreme Court established criteria for evaluating the re-
liability, admissibility, and probative value of expert epidemiological
evidence of a causal relationship between exposure to a toxic substance
and a particular injury. In Havner-one of thousands of cases brought
nationwide in which the plaintiffs alleged that birth defects in their chil-
dren were caused by the drug Bendectin-the supreme court suggested
that such evidence should be supported by more than one study showing
at least a doubling of the risk of the injury in the exposed population. 52
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court used another mass
tort case, involving the painkiller Vioxx, to emphasize that the criteria in
the Havner opinion are bright-line standards for determining the reliabil-
ity of expert evidence of causation based on epidemiology. In Merck &
Co. v. Garza, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed the legal sufficiency of
the evidence that the decedent's brief use of Vioxx caused his fatal heart
attack.53 The plaintiffs made two arguments: (1) that the expert's opinion
of a causal relationship was properly based on epidemiological evidence
indicating an elevated incidence of cardiovascular injury following the use
of Vioxx, evidence that was based on clinical studies that allegedly were
49. Id. at 172.
50. Id.
51. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
52. Id. at 717 (stating that "there is a rational basis for relating the requirement that
there be more than a 'doubling of the risk' to our no evidence standard of review and to
the more likely than not burden of proof"); id. at 727 (stating that "if scientific methodol-
ogy is followed, a single study would not be viewed as indicating that it is 'more probable
than not' that an association exists").
53. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 259-60 (Tex. 2011).
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more reliable than the unpublished observational studies offered in Hay-
ner; and (2) that "the totality of the evidence" was legally sufficient to
support the jury's finding of causation. 5 4 The supreme court emphatically
rejected both arguments. Stressing that "Havner's requirements necessa-
rily apply to all epidemiological evidence," including the clinical trials
upon which the plaintiffs relied,55 the supreme court found that the stud-
ies did not establish a doubling of the risk of heart disease in persons
similar to the decedent, who had taken low doses of Vioxx for a brief
period.56 The supreme court then observed that "[t]he totality of the evi-
dence cannot prove general causation if it does not meet the standards
for scientific reliability established by Havner."5 7 Based on the legal in-
sufficiency of the plaintiffs' proof of causation, the supreme court ren-
dered judgment for Merck.
In Faust v. BSNF Railway Co., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals recog-
nized that to prevail in a toxic tort case, the plaintiff must prove both
"general causation" (that the toxic "substance is capable of causing a par-
ticular injury") and "specific causation" (that the substance actually
caused the individual's injury).58 The court of appeals affirmed the jury's
finding that a railroad operating a plant that manufactured railroad ties
was not liable for damages related to a bystander's stomach cancer.5 9 The
plaintiff presented evidence that the railroad negligently used and dis-
posed of chemicals in the assembly of the ties; that the chemical waste
was dispersed into the nearby environment; and that the plaintiff's expo-
sure to the chemicals caused her cancer. The trial court instructed the jury
that to prove specific causation of her injury by the defendant's conduct,
the plaintiff "must exclude, with reasonable certainty, other plausible
causes of [her] stomach cancer." 6 0 In response to the jury question asking
whether the negligence, if any, of the railroad was a proximate cause of
the bystander's cancer, the jury answered, "No," and the trial court en-
tered judgment on the verdict. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the
instruction regarding specific causation improperly shifted to the jury the
trial court's "gatekeeper function" of determining the reliability of scien-
tific evidence of causation. The court of appeals rejected the argument,
holding that the instruction was not an abuse of discretion and did not
likely cause the rendition of an improper verdict. 6 1 Although the court of
appeals agreed "that it is the role of only the trial court to determine
whether an expert's testimony is reliable," it disagreed with the conten-
tion "that the burden to exclude other plausible causes of injury relates
54. Id. at 262.
55. Id. at 264.
56. Id. at 267-68.
57. Id. at 268.
58. Faust v. BSNF Ry. Co., 337 S.W.3d 325, 333 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet.
denied).
59. Id. at 329.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 336.
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solely to the trial court's rule 702 reliability inquiry." 62 The court of ap-
peals concluded that the specific causation instruction "assisted the jury
by providing it with 'the standard it was required by law to apply in mak-
ing its finding on a hotly-contested issue'-causation." 63
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN TEXAS AND FEDERAL
MDL PROCEEDINGS
As was noted earlier, during the Survey period the Texas Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation (the Texas MDL Panel or the Panel) was not
presented with any requests to transfer and consolidate litigation fitting
the technical definition of a mass tort.64 It did issue, however, an opinion
addressing the scope of MDL consolidation that is of interest to mass tort
practitioners. In April and May of 2012, the Panel issued a series of or-
ders transferring hundreds of cases brought by homeowners alleging that
insurers undervalued and mishandled claims for property damage caused
by Hurricanes Ike, Dolly, Hermine, and Alex.6 5 One of the insurers, State
Farm, sought transfer of the hurricane litigation as "tag-along cases" 66 to
non-hurricane related suits alleging similar mismanagement of property
insurance claims for roof shingle damage. The plaintiffs opposed consoli-
dation of the non-hurricane cases to the Hurricane MDL. Coining the
colorful phrase "MDL-scope creep," the plaintiffs argued that to be prop-
erly joined in an MDL consolidation, claims must be united by "one
event." 67 The Panel rejected the plaintiffs' contention, noting that the
Hurricane MDL already included claims for at least four separate storms.
The Panel emphasized that it "should not be heard to say that any lawsuit
involving shingle damages as a result of a wind event would automatically
be considered related," but the Panel concluded that suits based on "the
policies of State Farm regarding coverage for shingle damage arising from
wind events during the period between 2008 and 2010" were sufficiently
62. Id. at 335.
63. Id. at 335-36 (quoting Colum. Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d
851, 855, 862 (Tex. 2009)).
64. See Multidistrict Litigation Orders-2012, Sup. CT. TEX., http://www.supreme
.courts.state.tx.us/mdl/mdlhome.asp (last visited July 19, 2013).
65. Order of Multidistrict Litigation Panel, In re Geovera Specialty Ins. Co. Hurricane
Ike Litig., No. 12-0297 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel May 24, 2012); Order of Multidistrict Litigation
Panel, In re Nat'l Sec. Fire & Casualty Co. Hurricane Litig., No. 12-0271 (Tex. M.D.L.
Panel May 22, 2012); Order of Multidistrict Litigation Panel, In re Republic Lloyds Hurri-
canes Ike & Dolly Litig., No. 12-0262 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel May 22, 2012); Order of Multidis-
trict Litigation Panel, In re S. Vanguard Ins. Co. Hurricanes Ike & Dolly Litig., No. 12-0261
(Tex. M.D.L. Panel May 22, 2012); In re State Farm Lloyds Hurricane Ike Litig., M.O.L.
No. 12-0156, 2012 WL 6013273, at *1 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel May 21, 2012); Order of Multidis-
trict Litigation Panel, In re Cypress Tex. Lloyds Hurricane Ike Litig., No. 12-0230 (Tex.
M.D.L. Panel Apr. 25, 2012); Order of Multidistrict Litigation Panel, In re Nat'l Lloyds Ins.
Co. Hurricane Litig., No. 12-0248 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel Apr. 25, 2012); Order of Multidistrict
Litigation Panel, In re State Farm Lloyds Hurricane Ike Litig., No. 12-0156 (Tex. M.D.L.
Panel Apr. 25, 2012).
66. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.5(e) (2012).




related to be included in the Hurricane MDL. 6 8
As the Texas MDL Panel recognized in the Hurricane MDL litigation,
only related cases are eligible for tag-along transfer to an existing MDL
proceeding. In In re Champion Industrial Sales, LLC, the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals held that a case was not sufficiently related to an MDL
proceeding to permit the MDL pretrial court to retain jurisdiction over
the case. 69 This was true even though the plaintiff's original petition war-
ranted transfer.70 In In re Champion, the plaintiff alleged that her hus-
band died as a result of exposure to toxic hard-metal substances,
including silica, in the course of his employment, and she sued his em-
ployer and the suppliers of the materials to which he was exposed. After
the case was transferred to the multidistrict proceeding supervising the
silica litigation, the plaintiff filed an amended petition specifically deny-
ing that her husband's wrongful death was caused by silica. She then filed
a motion to remand the case from the MDL pretrial court to the original
trial court, attaching a medical report stating that her husband "did not
have silicosis" but instead "had hard metal lung disease."71 Based on
these filings, the MDL pretrial court concluded that the case was not re-
lated to the silica litigation-even though defendants' third-party claims
against the silica manufacturers remained-and remanded the case to the
court of origin. 72 The defendants asked the court of appeals to issue a
writ of mandamus requiring the MDL pretrial court to retain jurisdiction
over the case.
The court of appeals declined to do so. The court of appeals first noted
that a court sitting as an MDL pretrial court is not a court of general
jurisdiction; it cannot exercise jurisdiction over a case that was not "prop-
erly transferred" pursuant to the statute.73 The court of appeals cited the
general rule that objections to subject matter jurisdiction "can be raised
at any time" and, for cases transferred under the multidistrict litigation
statute, declined to adopt the "time of filing rule," under which a court
cannot be divested of jurisdiction by events that occur subsequent to fil-
ing. 74 The court of appeals concluded that the pretrial court had not
abused its discretion in removing the case from the MDL silica docket
and allowing the case to proceed in the court in which it was initially
filed.75
Meanwhile in the federal courts, the multidistrict proceeding concern-
ing the metal-on-metal hip prosthesis manufactured by DePuy Orthopae-
dics, Inc. (a division of Johnson & Johnson) remains pending in the
68. Id. at 135.
69. In re Champion Indus. Sales, LLC, 398 S.W.3d 812, 816-17, 824 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2012, no pet.).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 816.
72. Id. at 819.
73. Id. at 821-22.
74. Id. at 822-23.
75. Id. at 823-24.
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Northern District of Texas before the Honorable Ed Kinkeade. 76 The
court issued a pretrial order setting forth deadlines for completing discov-
ery, filing pretrial motions, and establishing a protocol for selection of
bellwether cases for trial. 7 The order requires the first bellwether case to
be ready for trial by September 1, 2014.78
IV. FIFTH CIRCUIT AND UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. SCIENTIFIC CAUSATION
Plaintiffs who alleged injury caused by exposure to a known toxic sub-
stance, but who could not support their allegations with epidemiological
studies demonstrating a clear causal link, fared no better in federal court
than in Texas state court. In Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., a worker claimed
that his exposure to chemicals known as MBTC and HCI in a glass manu-
facturing plant caused him both acute respiratory injuries and severe,
progressive pulmonary fibrosis.79 The worker supported his allegations
with the expert opinions of a pulmonary doctor and a toxicologist. Al-
though the experts were not able to cite an epidemiological study specifi-
cally associating MBTC and HCI with a greater than two-fold increased
risk of developing chronic pulmonary fibrosis, other cited data supported
their conclusions. This data included: (1) proof that MBTC and HCI are
part of a toxicological "class of chemicals" labeled as irritants that are
known to cause pulmonary fibrosis; (2) animal studies, including a study
of baboons, in which the animals developed pulmonary fibrosis after ex-
posure to high concentrations of HCI; (3) evidence that material safety
data sheets (MSDS) issued by the suppliers of MBTC contained warnings
that HCI "can be severely corrosive to the respiratory system" and
MBTC "CAUSES RESPIRATORY TRACT IRRITATION"; (4) evi-
dence that the worker was exposed to concentrations of HCI in between
two and ten times the permissible exposure levels set by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and levels of MBTC between
100 and 500 times OSHA's permissible exposure level set for that chemi-
cal; and (5) the temporal connection between the worker's exposure to
the chemicals, the development of his illness, and the absence of any
other plausible cause of the disease.80
Despite the abundance of circumstantial and common-sense factors im-
plicating the worker's occupational exposure to MBTC and HCI as the
cause of his pulmonary fibrosis, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's exclusion of the worker's expert opinions of causation as unrelia-
76. See Judges-MDL Cases, U.S. DIsT. C.-N. DisT. OF TEX., http://www.txnd.us
courts.gov/judges/MDL/mdl.html (last visited July 19, 2013).
77. Case Management Order No. 8 [Schedule of Pretrial Matters], In re DePuy Ortho-
paedics, Inc. Pinnacle Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., M.D.L. No. 3:11-MD-2244-K (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 14, 2012).
78. Id.
79. Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2012).
80. Id. at 461-67.
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ble.81 One by one, the court explained how each of the data upon which
the experts relied did not support a proper conclusion of cause-and-ef-
fect. The court rejected the "class of chemicals" theory because the class
included chemicals with "diverse chemical structures and toxicities of irri-
tants." 82 It dismissed the baboon study as unsupportive because the ex-
perts failed to show that there was a "correlation between the duration
and length of the baboon exposure and Mr. Johnson's exposure."83 It
found the MSDS of no consequence because the experts "failed to come
forth with any scientific data to support the MSDS's warning." 84 It dis-
counted the significance of the OSHA limits because the experts did "not
provide any scientific data or literature to explain how or why the various
exposure limits and guidelines were" adopted for the respective chemi-
cals.85 The Fifth Circuit also found the temporal relationship between the
exposure and the development of the condition, and the absence of other
possible causes, were not suggestive because the suggestion of causation
was "based on the presumption that MBTC and HCI [were] actually ca-
pable of causing restrictive lung disease and pulmonary fibrosis in the
general population," and the experts did not present "any reliable or rele-
vant scientific evidence to bolster this presumption."86 Although the Fifth
Circuit found that the worker's evidence supported his claim for acute
respiratory injury, it concluded that the district court acted within its dis-
cretion in excluding the experts' opinions that the occupational exposures
caused the worker's pulmonary fibrosis and in granting summary judg-
ment for the defendant on that claim.8 7
In a concurring opinion, Judge Reavley found the majority's rejection
of the experts' opinions on the causal relationship between the exposure
and the pulmonary fibrosis "simply incredible."88 To Judge Reavley, the
question of causation in this case involved fact questions to be decided by
the trier of fact.89 Judge Reavley suggested that the majority's insistence
on "fully tested and peer reviewed studies" to support the expert opin-
ions was unrealistic:
How would that study be designed and conducted, by obtaining a
large population of people to breathe this chemical vapor or that
vapor in this volume or that volume, then to have their lung function
tested and maybe biopsied? Where would so many persons be found
to be subjected to this?90
81. Id. at 456-57.
82. Id. at 461-62.
83. Id. at 463.
84. Id. (reasoning for HCI); id. at 465-66 (reasoning for MBTC).
85. Id. at 464 (reasoning for HCI); id. at 466 (reasoning for MBTC).
86. Id. at 469.
87. Id. at 472.
88. Id. at 473 (Reavley, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 472 (Reavley, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 473 (Reavley, J., concurring).
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Many toxic tort plaintiffs, unable to produce the kind of specific proof
that both the state and federal courts in Texas now require, have asked
the same rhetorical questions.
B. PREEMPTION
Tracking the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions on fed-
eral preemption of state law product liability claims against pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers is a bit like watching a fast-paced tennis match. In
2008, the Court issued its decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., holding
that because the manufacturer received premarket approval for its car-
diac catheter by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in compliance
with the Medical Device Act, the plaintiff's claim based on breach of the
manufacturer's state law duty was preempted.91 A year later, the Court
held in Wyeth v. Levine that the manufacturer's compliance with federal
regulations dictating the language of the warning on the manufacturer's
prescription drug did not preempt the manufacturer's duty to provide an
adequate warning under state law.92 The Court found that, unlike the
manufacturer in Riegel, the manufacturer in Wyeth could have complied
with both the federal regulations and state law because the regulations
allowed Wyeth to change its label as long as it filed a supplemental appli-
cation with the FDA.93
Most recently, the Court held in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing that the use of
an FDA-approved warning by manufacturers of a generic drug precluded
liability for failure to warn under state law.9 4 The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Thomas, candidly recognized that finding preemption of claims for
inadequate warning against generic drug makers but not against brand-
name manufacturers "makes little sense" from the standpoint of the con-
sumer.95 However, the Court felt constrained to reach this result because
under the federal statute "brand-name and generic drug manufacturers
have different federal drug labeling duties": a brand-name manufacturer
seeking FDA approval of a new drug "is responsible for the accuracy and
adequacy of its label," while a manufacturer seeking generic drug ap-
proval is responsible only "for ensuring that its warning label is the same
as the brand name's." 9 6 The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the manufacturers should not escape liability through federal preemption
"because they did not even try to start the process that might ultimately
have allowed them to use a safer label." 97 The Court found the argument
"fair," 98 but it declined to adopt an approach that would require "specu-
lation about ways in which federal agency and third-party actions could
91. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
92. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558-59, 581 (2009).
93. Id. at 568, 571.
94. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572, 2581 (2011).
95. Id. at 2581.
96. Id. at 2574.




potentially reconcile federal duties with conflicting state duties." 99 The
Court acknowledged "the unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation
has dealt" consumers of generic drugs but declined to distort the princi-
ples of federal preemption to force similar results "across a dissimilar
statutory scheme."100
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Sotomayor lamented that under
the Court's decision, "whether a consumer harmed by inadequate warn-
ings can obtain relief turns solely on the happenstance of whether her
pharmacist filled her prescription with a brand-name or generic drug." 101
Justice Sotomayor found unconvincing Justice Thomas's conclusion that
compliance with both the federal regulation and the state law duty was
impossible, noting that "had the [m]anufacturers invoked the available
mechanism for initiating label changes, they may well have been able to
change their labels in sufficient time to warn respondents." 1 0 2 Quoting
Justice Thomas himself, Justice Sotomayor bluntly stated her view that
"[t]he Court gets one thing right: This outcome 'makes little sense." 103
In Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, the Court found preemption of state law
from facts involving a claim for injuries caused by the side effects of vac-
cines. 104 The plaintiffs alleged that their daughter developed serious side
effects after receiving a vaccine against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertus-
sis.105 They filed an administrative claim for compensation under the Na-
tional Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA).1 06 After their
claim was denied, the plaintiffs filed a product liability claim against the
vaccine manufacturer alleging that the vaccine was defectively de-
signed.107 But the NCVIA contains a provision that "[n]o vaccine manu-
facturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages . . . if the injury or
death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the
vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions
and warnings."108 The district court and the Third Circuit both held that
this provision preempted the plaintiffs' claims, and the Supreme Court
affirmed in a majority opinion by Justice Scalia.109 Purporting to employ
a strictly textual analysis, Justice Scalia rejected the argument advanced
by the plaintiffs and the dissent that the language of the statute allows
claims based on the theory that an alternative feasible design would have
made the injury unavoidable.11 0 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor subjected
the text to an equally meticulous analysis and reached the opposite re-
99. Id. at 2580.
100. Id. at 2581-82.
101. Id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2587 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2581).
104. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011).
105. Id. at 1072, 1074-75.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006).
107. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1).
109. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1075, 1082.
110. Id. at 1075 ("The language of the provision thus suggests that the design of the
vaccine is a given, not subject to question in the tort action.") (emphasis in original).
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sult.'11 Her interpretation of the NCVIA would have allowed a jury, ap-
plying state law, to determine whether the injuries caused by the vaccine
could have been prevented "by a feasible alternative design that would
have eliminated the adverse side effects without compromising the vac-
cine's cost and utility."11 2 The majority's finding of preemption, Justice
Sotomayor concluded, "leaves a regulatory vacuum in which no one-
neither the FDA nor any other federal agency, nor state and federal ju-
ries-ensures that vaccine manufacturers adequately take account of sci-
entific and technological advancements."11 3 One might add that the
Court's decision in Bruesewitz also closes the courthouse doors to what
the majority acknowledged are thousands of potential claims for compen-
sation for avoidable injuries resulting from defective vaccines.114
C. SECURITIES FRAUD BASED ON FAILING To DISCLOSE TO
INVESTORS THE SCOPE OF POTENTIAL MASS TORT LIABILITY
In the last Survey, we recognized the relatively modern phenomenon
that a party charged with committing a mass tort may incur not only pri-
mary liability to the persons injured by the tortious conduct, but also sec-
ondary liability to persons whose financial positions have been harmed by
the defendant's false or misleading statements to the market about its
potential mass tort liability." 5 We reported that in Archdiocese of Mil-
waukee Supporting Fund v. Halliburton Co., the Fifth Circuit ruled that
an investor-plaintiff seeking damages for private securities fraud on be-
half of a class must demonstrate "loss causation" (that is, that the misrep-
resentations or omissions actually caused the sales of stock at an inflated
price) as a prerequisite for class certification.1 6 As noted in the Survey,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Archdiocese of
Milwaukee and has now reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision. In Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., the Court reasoned that the "loss cau-
sation" requirement for certification imposed by the Fifth Circuit con-
flicts with the Supreme Court's approval of the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory, which recognizes a presumption that the investor-plaintiff relied
on public misstatements if he purchased the stock at the price set by the
market.117 The Supreme Court's opinion in Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
could make it easier for investors, whose shares in a company lost value
after the company's potential mass tort liability became public, to main-
tain a class action for securities fraud. But such suits are a time-consum-
ing exercise. The suit against Halliburton, filed in 2002, has now entered
111. Id. at 1093-97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1093 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1101 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1072-73 (noting the "massive increase in vaccine-related tort litigation" that
prompted enactment of the NCVIA).
115. Rosenthal, supra note 28, at 595.
116. Id. at 595-96 (citing Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund v. Halliburton
Co., 597 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded sub nom. Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011)).
117. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2011).
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its second decade. Following remand from the Supreme Court, the issue
of the propriety of class certification is again before the Fifth Circuit on
interlocutory appeal from the district court.118
V. CONCLUSION
In the past decade, Texas has gone from a haven to a hinterland for
mass and toxic tort litigation. Isolated toxic tort cases continue to be
brought in the Texas state and federal courts, and occasionally mass tort
cases find their way to Texas as well. But this is more likely a function of
geographical and procedural imperative than preference. Once viewed as
"judicial hellholes," courts in Texas are now viewed by the plaintiff's bar
as icy and unreceptive to all but the most conventional legal theories and
factual scenarios. The relative dearth of significant activity in toxic tort
and mass tort litigation since the last Survey reflects this development.
Common sense suggests that this climate change has not reduced the
incidence of tortiously-caused toxic injuries or multi-victim cases in Texas
any more than the passage of tort reform applicable to medical liability
litigation has reduced the incidence of medical malpractice in the state. A
thaw in the cold climate for toxic and mass tort litigation in Texas will
likely occur only if and when the courts and the Texas legislature, through
their opinions and enactments, once again provide victims of tortious
conduct a realistic opportunity to recover compensation in the Texas
courts.
118. Order Granting Parties' Joint Motion for a Stay Pending Ruling on Defendants'
Appeal, Archdioceses of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-
CV-1152-M (N.D. Tex. June 4, 2012).
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